How to Secure a Synology NAS Against Ransomware
How to secure a Synology NAS against ransomware: update DSM, remove internet exposure, harden admin accounts and keep snapshots attackers cannot delete.
To secure a Synology NAS against ransomware, do four things in order: update DSM to a build that includes every current security advisory, take the DSM management interface off the public internet, harden the accounts that can log in, and keep a copy of the data that the NAS itself cannot overwrite. The C3RB3R campaign that pushed Synology DSM CVE-2024-10441 into CISA's exploited list in November 2026 succeeded against devices that skipped the first two steps. This guide walks through each one using Synology's own controls.
Why is a NAS a ransomware target?
A NAS holds the data, holds the backups of the data, and runs an operating system that nobody patches on a schedule. Encrypting it removes the files and the recovery path in one move. Synology's own statement on the 2026 attacks says the goal is to encrypt data and extort a ransom, and the attacks hit devices running outdated DSM versions.
That combination is why attackers return to NAS devices. The full account of the 2026 campaign, including fixed builds and indicators, is in our report on Synology DSM CVE-2024-10441 exploited by C3RB3R ransomware.
Step 1: Update DSM and turn on automatic updates
Synology's advice in the October 29, 2026 statement is two sentences: update DSM immediately, and enable automatic updates so the device stays current. Both matter. The CVE-2024-10441 fix shipped between November and December 2024, so every device hit in October 2026 had missed updates for almost two years.
Check the full build string, not the major version. Synology-SA-24:20 lists the minimum safe builds as 7.2.2-72806-1, 7.2.1-69057-6, 7.2-64570-4, 7.1.1-42962-7 and 6.2.4-25556-8. The newer Synology-SA-26:13 from September 2026 raises the floor again to 7.4-90075, 7.3.2-86009-4, 7.2.2-72806-9 or 7.2.1-69057-12. If your device is on a branch with no SA-26:13 build, Synology is telling you that branch no longer gets critical fixes. What that means for your hardware is covered in why end-of-life NAS firmware is a ransomware liability.
Do not forget packages. HKCERT's alert on the same campaign notes that Synology shipped separate PHP security updates through Package Center for DSM 7.4 down to 6.2, that dependent packages restart automatically after the PHP update, and that MailStation needs a manual update. Package Center has its own update list. Clear it.
Step 2: Take the management interface off the internet
Synology and BleepingComputer both give the same instruction for the 2026 attacks: block access to the DSM web management interface from the internet. HKCERT says it more broadly: avoid exposing NAS management interfaces directly to the internet, disable unnecessary services and port forwarding, and restrict remote access.
In practice:
- Log in to the router in front of the NAS and delete any port forward that points at the NAS management ports. If you do not know which ports, delete every forward to the NAS and add back only what a documented service needs.
- Disable UPnP on the router so the NAS cannot re-open ports for itself.
- If remote administration is required, reach the NAS over a VPN or a zero-trust access broker, never by exposing the login page.
- Enable the DSM firewall. Synology's 2019 ransomware guidance already said to enable the firewall in Control Panel and allow public ports only for services that need them. That advice still holds.
- Run Security Advisor. Synology describes it as a scanner for malware, vulnerable configurations and abnormal login activity, with scheduled scans that also flag out-of-date packages. Treat its findings as a work list.
BleepingComputer cites Shadowserver data showing more than 380,000 Synology devices exposed to the internet. Each one is a candidate for the next campaign regardless of which CVE it uses.
Step 3: Harden the accounts that can log in
CVE-2024-10441 did not need a password, but most NAS ransomware does. Synology's 2019 incident was brute-force logins against admin accounts, and its checklist from that event remains the baseline:
- Create a new account in the administrators group and disable the default
adminaccount. - Apply password strength rules to all users and use a long, unique password for every admin.
- Enable Auto Block in Control Panel so that repeated failed logins ban the source address.
- Turn on 2-step verification for every account that can reach DSM. Synology's Secure SignIn supports approval prompts in a mobile app and hardware security keys, including FIDO2 USB keys and Windows Hello or Touch ID.
- Enable Account Protection, which Synology describes as a control for brute-force attempts from untrusted clients.
Also remove accounts you do not recognize. A compromise check after an exploit should include the user list, scheduled tasks and the connection log.
Step 4: Keep a copy the NAS cannot destroy
Updating does not decrypt files. HKCERT states this plainly, and it is the reason backups decide whether an incident is an afternoon or a month. Synology ships three relevant tools:
- Snapshot Replication takes point-in-time copies of shared folders on the Btrfs file system and can replicate them to a second Synology. Synology's 2019 guidance recommended enabling snapshots specifically to recover from encryption-based ransomware.
- Immutable snapshots add a mandatory protection period. Synology describes them as a WORM technology: once taken, the snapshot cannot be altered or deleted until the period expires, even by an administrator. If an attacker gets admin on the NAS, ordinary snapshots can be deleted. Immutable ones cannot.
- Hyper Backup sends versioned copies to an off-site Synology, an external drive or a cloud provider. Synology's ransomware page recommends the 3-2-1 model: three copies, two media types, one off-site, and suggests replicating immutable snapshots to the secondary site.
What counts as isolated and immutable for insurance and audit purposes is spelled out in offline, isolated and immutable backups. The short version: if the ransomware operator who owns the NAS can also delete or encrypt the backup, it is not a backup.
Test a restore. HKCERT's guidance pairs "maintain offline or immutable backups" with "regularly test restoration procedures" for a reason. A snapshot you have never rolled back is a hope, not a plan.
How do you check whether a Synology NAS is already compromised?
Look for a ransom note file named read-me3.txt, files renamed with a L0CK3D extension, admin accounts you did not create, scheduled tasks you do not recognize and logins from unfamiliar addresses. Those indicators come from victim reports collected by BleepingComputer, not from Synology, which has not published indicators of compromise.
If you find any of them, follow HKCERT's order of operations: disconnect the NAS from the network, pause every sync and backup job so the encryption does not replicate, keep the ransom note and logs, do not reset or format, call incident response, and only after patching and resetting credentials from a clean device restore from verified backups.
Keep it that way
Put a quarterly reminder on the calendar to read Synology's security advisories page, confirm automatic updates are still on, run Security Advisor, and perform one test restore from a snapshot or Hyper Backup task. A NAS that is patched, unreachable from the internet, protected by MFA and backed by an immutable copy is a poor target. The 2026 campaign worked because so many devices were none of those things.