Synology DSM CVE-2024-10441 Exploited by C3RB3R Ransomware
Security

Synology DSM CVE-2024-10441 Exploited by C3RB3R Ransomware

CISA added Synology DSM CVE-2024-10441 to KEV on November 18, 2026 after C3RB3R ransomware hit NAS devices on old DSM builds. Patch and check exposure now.

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CISA added Synology DSM CVE-2024-10441 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on November 18, 2026, three weeks after Synology warned that attackers were encrypting NAS devices running outdated DiskStation Manager builds. The flaw is a CVSS 9.8 unauthenticated remote code execution bug patched in late 2024. Victims report C3RB3R ransomware notes and .L0CK3D files. If you run any Synology NAS or BeeStation, check the exact DSM build today, update it, and take the management interface off the public internet.

What happened

On October 29, 2026, Synology published a short statement from Taipei saying it had identified threat actors exploiting "a vulnerability patched in December 2024" against devices running outdated DSM versions. The goal, in Synology's words, is to encrypt data and extort a ransom. The statement pointed to one advisory, Synology-SA-24:20, and urged all users on vulnerable versions to update immediately and turn on automatic updates. It did not name a CVE and did not name the ransomware.

BleepingComputer filled in the rest on November 2. Victims on Reddit and the BleepingComputer forums had been reporting encrypted shares for more than two weeks before Synology's notice. The ransomware is C3RB3R, also tracked as Cerber or CerberImposter, a family that borrowed its name from a ransomware-as-a-service operation active from 2016 to 2019. The note file is read-me3.txt, encrypted files carry the .L0CK3D extension, and the note directs victims to a dark web portal selling a "C3rb3r Decryptor" for thousands of dollars. A Synology spokesperson, asked which flaw was in play, pointed BleepingComputer back to SA-24:20, which covers three CVEs.

CISA resolved that ambiguity on November 18 by adding CVE-2024-10441 to KEV "based on evidence of active exploitation." It was one of four additions that day, alongside Apache Axis CVE-2026-90436, REDCap CVE-2026-90817 and LiteLLM CVE-2026-40217. The Hacker News reported the KEV listing on November 19 and tied it to the C3RB3R campaign. One detail worth noting: the KEV record still lists known ransomware use as "Unknown," even though the public reporting is entirely about ransomware. Treat the C3RB3R link as strong but vendor-unconfirmed.

Synology rarely issues notices about live attacks on its customers. BleepingComputer notes the last one was in August 2019, after brute-force logins led to eCh0raix infections. That earlier wave needed stolen passwords. This one does not.

Who is affected

SA-24:20 was published on November 5, 2024 and covers bugs demonstrated at Pwn2Own 2024. Synology credits Pumpkin Chang and Orange Tsai of DEVCORE, Ryan Emmons and Team Smoking Barrels. Three CVEs are included:

  • CVE-2024-10441, CVSS 9.8, improper encoding or escaping of output (CWE-116) in the system plugin daemon. Unauthenticated remote code execution. This is the KEV entry.
  • CVE-2024-50629, CVSS 5.3, the same weakness class in the webapi component, allowing limited file reads.
  • CVE-2024-10445, CVSS 4.3, improper certificate validation in the update function, allowing an adjacent attacker to write limited files.

Per the CVE record, CVE-2024-10441 affects DSM 7.2.2 before 7.2.2-72806-1, DSM 7.2.1 before 7.2.1-69057-6, DSM 7.2 before 7.2-64570-4, DSM 7.1 before 7.1.1-42962-7, and BeeStation OS (BSM) before 1.1-65374. Synology rates DSM 6.2 as moderate for this advisory and lists 6.2.4-25556-8 as its fixed build.

The fixes did not all ship at once. Synology's revision history shows the DSM 7.2.2 fix on November 5, 2024, DSM 7.2.1 on November 12, DSM 7.1 on November 26 and DSM 6.2 on December 5. That December date is probably what the October 29 statement refers to. Technical details were disclosed in March 2025, so attackers have had public write-ups for about 20 months.

The exposed population is large. BleepingComputer cites Shadowserver data showing more than 380,000 Synology NAS devices reachable from the internet, with no breakdown of how many are patched. The Hong Kong CERT alert of November 2 says the campaign targets end-of-life DSM versions specifically. If your organization has a Synology in a branch office, a backup closet or a home office that syncs company data, assume it is in scope until you have read its build string.

Technical analysis of Synology DSM CVE-2024-10441

CWE-116 is an output encoding failure: a component builds a structured message for another component and fails to escape data that the receiver will interpret as control syntax. In DSM the vulnerable component is the system plugin daemon, and the result is code execution without credentials and without user interaction. Synology's advisory calls the vector "unspecified," and Synology has published no indicators of compromise. For how this weakness class works and why it keeps producing critical bugs, see what CWE-116 improper output encoding is.

What makes this campaign effective is not novelty. The bug is two years old and the fix is in every supported DSM branch. The attackers are counting on three things: NAS devices that nobody updates, management interfaces forwarded through consumer routers or exposed via port forwarding, and the fact that a NAS is often the backup target, so encrypting it removes the recovery path at the same time.

C3RB3R's operators have run this playbook before. BleepingComputer notes the family has been deployed against Atlassian Confluence and GitLab servers since December 2021 using CVE-2021-26084, CVE-2021-22205 and CVE-2023-22518, all internet-facing applications with public exploits and slow patch uptake. The target changed. The method did not.

Two related items are easy to confuse with this one. First, Synology published SA-26:13 on September 18, 2026 with eight more DSM CVEs, including two more CVSS 9.8 bugs (CVE-2026-13684 and CVE-2026-13639), fixed in 7.4-90075, 7.3.2-86009-4, 7.2.2-72806-9 and 7.2.1-69057-12. Those are not in KEV and Synology has not linked them to this campaign. Second, HKCERT points out that Synology separately extended PHP2Shell fixes to older DSM releases, and that Synology has not confirmed whether PHP2Shell played any role in the ransomware attacks. Patch both anyway.

What to do now

  1. Read the full build string on every Synology device. Control Panel shows it under Info Center. A major version like "7.2.2" is not enough; the number after the dash matters. Anything below the SA-24:20 thresholds above is vulnerable. Any device on the SA-26:13 builds or later already includes the 2024 fix.
  2. Update and turn on automatic updates. Synology's statement asks for both. Updating does not decrypt files already encrypted, and HKCERT warns that the PHP2Shell fixes for end-of-life DSM do not return those versions to full support.
  3. Remove the management interface from the internet. BleepingComputer's advice, repeated by Synology, is to block access to the DSM web interface from outside. Kill the router port forwards, disable the services you do not use, and put remote admin behind a VPN. A step-by-step hardening checklist is in how to secure a Synology NAS against ransomware.
  4. Check for compromise, not just version. CISA marked this entry for forensic triage under BOD 26-04, which means federal agencies must check whether the device was already compromised before patching. Do the same: look for read-me3.txt, .L0CK3D files, unfamiliar admin accounts, new scheduled tasks and logins from unexpected addresses.
  5. Verify your backups exist somewhere the NAS cannot reach. If the Synology is the backup target, confirm there is an off-device or immutable copy and test a restore before you need it. Our guide to offline, isolated and immutable backups covers what counts.
  6. If files are already encrypted, follow HKCERT's sequence: isolate the device, pause sync and backup jobs so the damage does not replicate, preserve the ransom note and logs, do not reset or format, bring in incident response, and restore only after patching and credential resets from a clean machine. Paying is not a recovery plan.

Devices that cannot run a supported DSM branch should be replaced. HKCERT says so directly, and the KEV required action says to discontinue use when mitigations are unavailable. The reasoning is laid out in why end-of-life NAS firmware is a ransomware liability.

What to watch next

The federal remediation due date is November 21, 2026, three days after the listing. Expect CISA to update the ransomware field once an agency or vendor confirms the link. Watch for Synology to add indicators of compromise or a revision to SA-24:20, and for any confirmation of whether the SA-26:13 bugs or PHP2Shell are being chained. Shadowserver's exposure count is the number to track for whether the patching message is landing.

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